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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

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ALERT MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council

SUBJECT: Egypt-Libya (U)

The Egyptian plan for a [] military incursion into eastern Libya [] is still on track according to our latest information. The attached Alert Memorandum discusses the implications for Egypt and the United States of such an Egyptian attack []

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Attachment

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

1 August 1979

ALERT MEMORANDUM*

Egypt-Libya

The Egyptian plan for a [REDACTED] military incursion into eastern Libya [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] is still on track [REDACTED] President

Sadat appears in a supremely confident frame of mind following the successful conclusion of the peace treaty with Israel, and may be in a mood to strike at his Arab critics by attempting to fulfill his long desired goal of toppling the Qadhafi regime. Libya expects an Egyptian attack.

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Current senior officials who have misgivings about the attack are constrained, however, by their previous record of support for it. Nonetheless, forceful warnings from his advisers--should they find the mettle to speak frankly--might again cause Sadat to delay. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
we believe that chances for a limited Egyptian military success--such as reaching the outskirts of Tobruk--are good.

**The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policymakers are aware of the serious implications for US interests of impending potential developments. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at the working level by CIA, DIA, NSA, and State/INR.*

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The growing presence of foreign military specialists in Libya could be a complicating factor for Egyptian planners but we do not expect significant foreign intervention on Libya's behalf. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] foreign forces are not likely to play a significant role if an Egyptian-Libyan clash is brief. A more prolonged conflict, however, could prompt other Arab states--possibly Syria and Iraq--to dispatch token forces in a show of solidarity and in response to expected Libyan calls for help. The USSR would probably provide operational advice and logistic support to the Libyans, and might undertake an airlift to resupply Libyan forces. They are unlikely to become directly involved in military operations with the possible exception of air or air defense personnel. [REDACTED]

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Virtually all the other Arab states would feel compelled to condemn Egypt in the event of an unprovoked Egyptian attack. Mediation of the conflict would be made difficult because of Egypt's isolation in the Arab world. Charges would likely emerge that the United States and Israel sanctioned the military move by Egypt unless there were convincing evidence of a Libyan provocation. As a result:

- Egyptian and US efforts to broaden the current peace negotiations would be made even more difficult.
- Attempts to impose additional sanctions against Egypt would probably be made.
- Libya would likely retaliate against the United States, perhaps through a ban on oil exports to the United States, which account for 10% of US oil imports, or by nationalizing US oil companies.
- Moscow would certainly applaud Arab efforts to apply further sanctions to Sadat in retaliation for the attack on Libya and would approve any Libyan moves to cut oil exports to the United States. [REDACTED]

A prolonged conflict with Libya would not be popular with Egyptians who look forward to an era of peace following conclusion of the treaty with Israel. If the war went sour, domestic critics of President Sadat and his policies would have new ammunition to use against

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him. Discontent of serious proportions also could develop within the Egyptian military if resistance were unexpectedly stiff, and casualties were high, or outside military support for Libya were wide ranging. The consequences for the stability of Sadat's regime may be even more pronounced if the conflict is widely perceived as a failure of Sadat's policy and judgment. [REDACTED]

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